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MATILAL, Bitnal Krishna (1935-91) 
Bimal Matilal was born in Joynagar, West 
Bengal, India and died in Oxford in June 1991. 
He was educated at Islamia College and 
Sanskrit College, and then at the University of 
MATILAL 
Calcutta, where he gained the traditional 
Tarkatirtha, 'Master of Dialectic', degree. He 
was appointed lecturer in Sanskrit at Presidency 
College, Calcutta in 1957. From 1962 to 1965 
he was at Harvard University, where he was 
awarded his PhD. He was Professor of Sanskrit 
at the University of Toronto from 1965 to 
1976. During this professorship he held visiting 
appointments at the University of Pennsylvania, 
and the School of Oriental and African Studies 
at the University of London. He became 
founder editor of the Journal of Indian 
Philosophy in 1970. In 1976 he was appointed 
Spalding Professor of Eastern Religion and 
Ethics in the University of Oxford, and fellow 
of All Souls. 
Matilal was a leading exponent of Indian 
logic and epistemology, and of the role of phi-
losophy in classical Indian society. Other 
concerns of his were the deconstruction of 
Western perceptions of Indian philosophy and 
an examination of the thinking that had 
informed Indian intellectuals such as 
RADHAKRISHNAN. His philosophy drew on 
grammatical literature, the epics, dharmasas-
tras, medical literature, poetics and literary crit-
icism. His Ethics and Epics (2000) sought to 
uncover the moral theorizing implicit in the 
epics, the Ramayana and the Mahabharata. 
Matilal's eclecticism had methodological 
motivations. He held that only through a com-
prehensive study of literature can one discover 
the mechanisms of the internal criticism to 
which a dynamic culture necessarily subjects 
itself. Indian philosophy had been misconstrued 
as predominantly spiritual, mystical and intu-
itive, and Matilal's method, in counteraction to 
the Orientalists, was to examine the relationship 
between contemporary and classical philoso-
phy. Subsequently, he was criticized for over-
dependence on contemporary Anglo-American 
philosophy. However, he saw his work as a 
necessary corrective to the view of Indian 
philosophers as irrational mystics (Perception, 
pp. 4, 5). More importantly, he believed that by 
relating current thinking to tradition, new 
insights could be developed from the epistemes 
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of the indigenous systems. An example of this 
is the epistemology of testimony, where the 
Indian discussions have a real prospect of 
informing contemporary debates. A co-edited 
book, Knowing from Words, and writings of 
his students on Sabda-Pramana are impressive 
illustrations of the sort of philosophical 'inter-
connecting' Matilal sought. 
Another example is his defence of a form of 
direct realism in his Perception (1986). The 
common sense realism of the Nyaya philoso-
phers asserts that we do indeed see the objects 
we take ourselves to see, that those objects exist 
by having parts without being merely the sum 
of their parts, and that they fall into objective, 
natural categories, by dint of the disclosure of 
real universals inherent in their constitution. 
Thus, we see a 'red patch' (substantial ground) 
and thence relate qualias of 'hotness', 'round-
ness', 'pepperness' to it. The resultant percept is 
non-partite, meaning the whole is greater than 
the all the parts. Matilal's defence of this theory 
is anchored on the unique formulation of objec-
tivity. To be objective is to be independent of 
minds. Being 'mind-dependent', however, need 
not mean being a private, intentional object in 
the way that sense-data and other purely phe-
nomenal entities are. It can mean simply having 
a mental event as a causal condition, an event 
on whose continuing existence the object 
depends. Although illusory, for instance, the 
blueness of the sky and the ellipticality of the 
disc are objective in the sense that they are not 
purely private objects of sensation, but are 
produced and shared by the perception of any 
observer located in the appropriate position. 
This is a softer realism than that to which 
sceptics are committed, according to which 
objects can exist independently of anyone's 
capacity to know they exist. 
Matilal was a rare kind of thinker, a philoso-
pher of sensibility who embodied East and West 
in balanced proportions and who demonstrated 
that Indian thought, even in its most meta-
physical and soteriological concerns, was rig-
orously analytical and logical as well as discur-
sive. His work has found broad endorsement 
and inspired lively debate not only among many 
contemporary Indian philosophers and 
Indologists, but also in international philo-
sophical circles. 
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